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THE ROLE OF LOCALITIES IN THE TRANSPORTATION AND
DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Transportation and disposal of nuclear wastes brings the apprehensions
associated with nuclear power into close physical and psychological proximity to many Americans. The subject of transportation comes with its
own set of problems, including potential accidents, packaging, routing, security, sabotage, and special agency actions.' Common to all of these
problems is the element of the unknown. "Clearly nuclear shipments present some kind of public health hazard, not necessarily as great as some
other activities do and . . . the nature of that hazard is not known
precisely." 2
Concerns over this unquantifiable, yet certain, danger have been developing against a slowly evolving patchwork of federal regulations. State, 3
city,4 and county5 organizations and nonprofit public benefit organizations6 all seek to keep radioactive wastes away from their citizens.
1. Hansell & Sekuler, Representing States and Citizens in Litigation Involving Nuclear
Waste, 144 LITIGATION AD.PRAC. SERIES NUCLEAR LITIGATION 96 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Hansell & Sekuler, NUCLEAR LITIGATION].
2. Defining the dimensions of a potential radiological transportation accident is difficult,
for it goes beyond simply postulating a particular kind of truck or train accident at a
given speed. The extent of container failure, and the corresponding amount of radioactivity released, must be assumed. Also, the description must specify the degree of
dispersion of the radioactivity (over how large an area with what density), and this
obviously depends in part on atmospheric conditions. Other imponderables include
the length of time that bystanders are exposed (say, in backed up traffic) before it
becomes known that the radioactivity has been released.
R. Norton, Policy Issues in the Routing of Radioactive Materials Shipments, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 735, 740 (1981).
3. See Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983) (Washington State's statutory ban on importation of lowlevel wastes originating outside of state was found to be violative of commerce clause).
4. New York City Health Code § 175.11 prohibits transportation of radioactive materials
in or through the city. This was recently ruled to be preempted by regulations of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. See generally City of New York v. Department of
Transp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983).
5. See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 438 A.2d 269 (1981)
(County ordinance prohibiting disposal in and transportation through county of various hazardous wastes, including nuclear wastes, found void as burden on interstate commerce). See
also infra note 245, Spotsylvania County, Va., Ordinance to Regulate Transportation of Radioactive Materials (March 22, 1983); Louisa County, Va., Ordinance on Spent Nuclear Fuel
(Dec. 18, 1978).
6. See Virginia Sunshine Alliance v. Hendrie, 477 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1979) (denial of
injunction, requested by public benefit organization, against shipping of spent fuel through

city of Portsmouth).
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The Commonwealth of Virginia has focused concerns over the transportation and disposal of nuclear wastes due to three possible future developments: siting of a low level waste repository in Virginia,7 shipment of
spent fuel from Virginia Electric and Power Company's (VEPCO's) Surry
nuclear facility in Surry County, Virginia, to its North Anna plant in
Louisa County, Virginia,8 and consideration of Virginia as a permanent
storage site for high level radioactive wastes.9 An ambiguous situation exists from which state and local governments must try to anticipate
problems as well as solutions which will be consistent with federal regulations. This note will discuss federal preemption principles as applied to
two local attempts to regulate nuclear waste transportation and disposal.
Focus will be first on the Louisa County, Virginia, ordinance banning importation of nuclear wastes into that county, and then on the Spotsylvania County, Virginia, ordinance purporting to regulate shipments of nuclear wastes through that county. This note will trace a line of court
decisions interpreting relevant statutes which lead to the conclusion that
ordinances such as those of Louisa and Spotsylvania Counties cannot
withstand federal preemption challenges. In light of this statutory interpretation, possible alternatives to the ordinance preemption predicaments
will be discussed. 10
II.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WASTES

Any attempt to understand the regulatory maze imposed upon the disposal of commercially" generated nuclear waste must begin by distinguishing between the different types of wastes. There are two basic categories of wastes, low level and high level. 12 Within each of these categories
7. The Barnwell Nuclear Waste Facility in Barnwell, S.C., used by member states of the
South Atlantic States Low Level Waste Compact, will reach projected capacity in 1992. Virginia and other members of the compact are researching new repository locations. Seventeen
Virginia counties are being considered as potential sites. Ten counties and two towns have
asked to be removed from that list. Richmond News Leader, Feb. 3, 1983, § B, at 1, col. 1.
8. Leon Engle, NRC project director of the VEPCO North Anna Power Station, said that
this possibility was contingent upon final determination as to the validity of the Louisa
County ordinance banning storage of spent fuel not generated within the county, and upon
licensing of augmentation of North Anna's storage capacity and transportation from Surry
or North Anna. Telephone interview (Oct. 4, 1983).
9. Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201,
the federal government is charged with establishing permanent repositories for disposal of
high-level nuclear waste. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. Because of granite
and crystalline formations in the mountains, Virginia has recently been added to the list of
states where underground storage might be feasible. Richmond Times Dispatch, Sept. 27,
1983, § A, at 1, col. 1.
10. In light of the number of states which have passed legislation similar to the Louisa
County ordinance (see infra note 120), the presence of nuclear facilities and waste disposal
sites appears to be viewed as undesirable. But see infra note 166.
11. Emphasis will be given to transportation of non-military, high-level nuclear wastes.

12. S.

FENN, THE NUCLEAR POWER DEBATE: ISSUES AND CHOICES

170 (1981).
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is a number of subgroups, most easily identified according to the type of
packaging that is required by federal regulations for transport.13
Low level wastes are radioactive contaminated materials "not classified
as high level radioactive waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, or
by-product material . . . [such as uranium or thorium]."14 Low level
wastes are generated in the course of "manufacturing, power generations,
processing, medical diagnosis and treatment, research, or other industrial
or commercial activity. ' 15 Low level wastes incident to power generation
at nuclear facilities consist, for example, of contaminated clothing used
by workers, and reactor equipment. If low level wastes are released incident to an accident, the risks are minimal.'" Some types of low level
wastes may be shipped in "strong tight packages," while others require
Type A packaging. 7
High level wastes"' include fission products which emit gamma rays' 9
characterized by highly penetrating radiation. 0 They also contain transuranic elements such as plutonium, which does not have highly penetrating
radiation but does have high radio-toxicity and may present hazards for
up to a million years. 21 High level wastes generally include research and
industrial sources as well as spent fuel, and they must be shipped in either Type B or Type B large quantity packaging. 2" This note is concerned
13. See generally 10 C.F.R. §§ 71.4-.42 (1983).
14. Id. § 61.2 (1982).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-238.1 (Cure. Supp. 1983).
16. Telephone interview with Mr. A.C. McNeer, Radiological Safety Specialist, Bureau of
Radiological Health, Virginia State Board of Health (Sept. 26, 1983).
17. Type A. Designated to withstand the stress of transit under non-accident conditions
(e.g., rough handling). Because of the smaller quantities of material permitted in
Type A packages, accidents causing damage to such packages would be unlikely to
constitute the majority of shipments and must only withstand moderate degrees of
stress for such conditions as heat, cold, reduced air pressure, vibration, impact, water,
drugs, penetration, and compression. Includes radiopharmaceuticals, research, industrial sources, and some fuel cycle materials.
Commonwealth of Virginia Radiological Emergency Response Plan, app. 14-11 (June 1983)
[hereinafter cited as RERP].
18. High-level radioactive waste means: 1) irradiated reactor fuel, 2) liquid wastes resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and
the concentrated wastes from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility
for reprocessing irradiated reattor fuel, and 3) solids into which such liquid wastes
have been converted.
10 C.F.R. § 60.2(b)(j) (1983).
19. Gamma rays are electromagnetic radiations of high energy originating in atomic nuclei
and accompanying many nuclear reactions. Gamma rays do not consist of particles, have no
mass, travel at the speed of light, are highly penetrating, and may cause damage to living
tissue. RERP, supra note 17, at app. 15-4.
20. S. FENN, supra note 12, at 171.
21. Id.
22. Type B. Designed for transport of much greater quantities of radioactive materials. In
addition to meeting standards for Type B packages, they must withstand drop, punc-
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with high level wastes, specifically spent fuel rods incident to generation
of electricity at a nuclear power facility.23

III.
A.

NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL: THE LOUISA COUNTY ORDINANCE IN
LIGHT OF CURRENT JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY

Louisa County's Spent Fuel Ordinance

On December 4, 1978, the Board of Supervisors of Louisa County, Virginia, enacted the Spent Fuel Ordinance. 24 The ordinance makes it "unlawful for any person, partnership, corporation or any other entity to
store or maintain in Louisa County any spent nuclear fuel or any other
radioactive waste materials of similar qualities, except such materials as
may result from nuclear fuel being used in Louisa County. ' 25 The ordinance provides strict penalties for noncompliance 6 and contains a severability clause.2 7 In theory, the ordinance would effectively ban, within the
ture, thermal, and water immersion stresses that might be experienced under actual
or hypothetical transportation accident conditions. They include research and industrial sources and certain fuel cycle materials.
Type B Large Quantity. Designed to withstand the same hypothetical accident stresses as
Type B. They may contain thousands of curies and could cause serious health effects
if packages are breached. They include research and industrial sources and spent nuclear fuel.
RERP, supra note 17, at app. 14-11.
23. "In 1977, President Carter announced that due to concern over the potential for
proliferation of nuclear weapons arising from an expanded plutonium-based nuclear economy, spent fuel reprocessing and the development of advanced plutonium-based reactors
would be indefinitely deferred in this country." H. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3794
(1982). This decision resulted in greatly increased activity in the field of nuclear waste storage because commercial facilities needed permanent storage arrangements since reprocessing would no longer be possible.
24. For purposes of this note it will be assumed that, absent federal regulation to the
contrary, Louisa County has the authority to adopt such an ordinance. See, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-510 (Repl. Vol. 1981) ("Any county may adopt such measures as it may deem
expedient to secure and promote the health, safety and general welfare of the inhabitants of
such county ....");Board of Supervisors v. Pumphrey, 221 Va. 205, 207, 269 S.E.2d 361,
362 (1980) ("If both the statute and ordinance can stand together, courts are obliged to
harmonize them, rather than nullifying the ordinance."). Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.17 (Repl.
Vol. 1979) ("When the council or authorities of any city or town, or any corporation, board,
or number of persons, are authorized to make ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations or orders, it shall be understood that the same must not be inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States or of this State.").
25. See supra note 5.
26. "Anyone violating or causing anyone to violate this ordinance shall be fined not more
than $1,000.00; and each day that any such violation continues shall be a separate offense."
Louisa County, Va., Ordinance on Spent Nuclear Fuel (Dec. 18, 1978).
27. "If any phrase, clause, sentence, part or portion of this ordinance shall be declared
unconstitutional or invalid by any valid judgment or decree of a Court of competent jurisdiction, such unconstitutionality or invalidity shall not effect [sic] any of the remaining
phrases, clauses, sentences, portions or parts of this ordinance." Id.
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county, the disposal of spent nuclear wastes2" that are generated outside
of its borders. However, spent nuclear fuel that is generated within the
county may be stored or maintained inside its borders.
In 1981, VEPCO applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
for a license that would permit VEPCO to transport spent nuclear wastes
from the Surry plant to the North Anna plant. However, the Louisa
County ordinance would prohibit the disposal of spent Surry fuel in Louisa County because the spent nuclear wastes were generated outside the
county's borders. VEPCO brought suit against Louisa County alleging
that its Spent Fuel Ordinance should be declared unconstitutional because it violated both the supremacy and commerce clauses.2 9 On March
4, 1983, United States District Judge D. Dortch Warriner ruled that the
county's ordinance was preempted by congressional legislation and that
the ordinance prohibitively interfered with interstate commerce.2 0
B. Preemption Principles
The federal preemption doctrine arises from the interaction between
the supremacy clause of article VP1 and the tenth amendment's 3 reserva-

tion of authority to the states to exercise all powers not delegated to the
federal government. The doctrine stands for the principle that a valid
exercise of federal power preempts or supersedes an incompatible state
law.

33

The first question of a preemption analysis is whether Congress has
validly established federal legislation in the nuclear energy field pursuant
to the powers delegated by the Constitution.3 4 A brief perusal of congres28. For purposes of this note the terms spent nuclear waste and high-level nuclear waste
will be used interchangeably. For a statutory definition of high-level nuclear waste, see
supra note 18.
29. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Louisa County, Va., No. 83-1241 (E.D. Va. March 4,
1983).
30. Louisa County was argued on appeal in the Fourth Circuit on November 3, 1983. The
parties settled the case a few months later.
31. This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made, in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
32. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
33. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA,
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267-79 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 623 (1978).
34. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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sional findings makes it apparent that the power to develop and regulate
nuclear energy stems from the commerce clause, the war powers clauses,
and the authority to promote the general welfare and to protect the general public.3 5 Accordingly, the majority of commentators 6 and courts3"
have assumed valid congressional authority to regulate the nuclear energy
industry.
The second inquiry is whether Congress has expressly preempted state
and local authority to regulate in a particular field. 8 If compliance with
both federal and state law is impossible because the laws are in conflict,
no finding of congressional intent need be ascertained, and the state or
local law is preempted.39 Absent any direct conflict between federal and
state law, a court must determine whether Congress has manifested an
express intent to preempt state law in a given area.4" If express intent to
preempt is found, state law must give way to congressional authority.
If no express intent is found, Congress may nevertheless be said to have
35. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 indicates that:
Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as military purposes. It is
therefore declared to be the policy of the United States that - (a) the development,
use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective of
making the maximum contribution to the common defense and security; and (b) the
development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote
world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living and
strengthen free competition in private enterprise.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2011(a), (b) (West 1973). See also Estop & Aldermann, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41, 44-54
(1961). But see Jaksetic, ConstitutionalDimensions of State Efforts to Regulate Nuclear
Waste, 32 S.C.L. REv. 789, 849 (1981) ("[T]he majority view that the federal government
can preempt wholly the field of radiation hazards regulation is based on an inadequate analysis of the constitutional bases for such an assertion of federal authority.").
36. See, e.g., Esgain, State Authority and Responsibility in the Atomic Energy Field,
1962 DuKE L.J. 163; Green, Nuclear Technology and the Fabric of Government, 33 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 121, 124-25 (1964); Helman, Pre-emption: Approaching Federal-StateConflict Over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 43 (1967); Murphy & La
Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A
Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Simmons v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 655 F.2d 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1981)
("Congress, through its power to regulate interstate commerce and provide for the national
defense and general welfare, clearly can enact legislation governing the use of nuclear energy."); Minnesota v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978); Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman,
518 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1841 (1983); United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604, 607 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
38. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1146.
39. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), reh'g denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963).
40. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1146.
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impliedly preempted state law where it has exercised a "scheme of regulation" in a particular field. 4' "[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme
of regulation . . . states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or. . . complement the federal law, or enforce additional or
auxiliary regulations. '42 In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,4s the Supreme Court indicated that the goal in each case was to determine Congress' purpose in enacting the legislation.
Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of federal
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law
and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.
... Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective
4
of the federal statute. 4
The preemption doctrine consists of a set of unstructured principles
which, as the Supreme Court admits, provides no "rigid formula or rule
which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and
purpose. . . of Congress. ' 45 The Court uses various terms in attempts to
pinpoint how federal law preempts state or local law,46 but acknowledges
that "[iun the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula. '47 However, the Court does assert that its "primary
function is to determine whether . . . [state] law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
'4
Congress.
To determine the validity of congressional preemption in the nuclear
field, the history of congressional activity in the area of the nuclear industry should be examined.
41. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
42. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
43. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
44. Id. at 230 (citations omitted).
45. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.

46. "This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal
laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; con-

trary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference." Id.

47. Id.
48. Id.
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C. Federal Regulation in the Nuclear Industry
1. Evolution of the Atomic Energy Act
Atomic energy became the subject of comprehensive federal legislation
for the first time with the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946."9
Congress' initial regulatory concerns were for the common defense and
security in the development and use of atomic energy, because its primary use at that time was for military purposes. 50 These militaristic interests led the federal government to retain complete control over the entire spectrum of the nuclear industry.51
Congressional recognition of the advancing nuclear energy technology
in the private sector led to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954.52 This Act is the foundation for the pervasive scheme of federal
regulations governing all phases of "construction and operation of any
production or utilization facility.

'53

Its purpose 54 was to encourage pri-

vate industry in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 55 and to insure that its promotion proceeded safely. 56 The Act established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which, in turn, gave
authority to private concerns to develop and utilize nuclear technology.
The AEC, through the establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), retained exclusive control through strict licensing procedures.5 7 This retention of complete authority by the AEC caused dissatisfaction and frustration in many state legislatures, which ultimately led to
the adoption, by thirteen states, of model acts for concurrent regulation.5 8
2.

Section 274
In 1959, Congress amended the 1954 Act by adding section 274.59 The

49. 60 Stat. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1952).
50. See supra note 35. (Remarks referring to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are likewise
applicable to the 1946 Act in those respects which concern the military.)
51. For an overview of regulation under the 1946 Act, see Newman, The Atomic Energy
Industry: An Experiment in Hybridization, 60 YALE L.J. 1263 (1951).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
53. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1149 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1959)).
54. For an overview of the history and congressional purpose of the 1954 Act, see 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3459.

55. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976).
56. Id. § 2012(e).
57. The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished in 1974. See Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88
Stat. 1233. It was replaced with the Energy Research and Development Administration (42
U.S.C. § 5814 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (42 U.S.C. §
5841 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). For current licensing procedures, see 10 C.F.R. § 2913, pt. 2,
app. A (1983).
58. Esgain, supra note 36, at 171.
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021 (West 1973 & Supp. 1984).
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passage of the amendment created the states' first opportunity for valid
regulation in the nuclear energy field. At this point the crux of the preemption analysis emerges.
Section 274 recognizes the interests of state governments,"0 the need for
cooperation between federal and state governments,"1 and provides for
"turnover agreements" whereby the states may assume, with the federal
government's approval, specified authority held by the AEC.2 The thrust
of section 274 is contained in subsections (b)6 3 and (c).6 4 Subsection
274(b) allows the NRC to enter into agreements with the states to discontinue the NRC's authority over the regulation of byproduct,65 source,"8
and special nuclear material 7 not sufficient to form a critical mass.68
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. § 2021(a)(1).
Id. § 2021(a)(2).
Id. § 2021(b).
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission is authorized to
enter into agreements with the Governor of any State providing for discontinuance of
the regulatory authority of the Commission under subchapters V, VI and VII of this
chapter, and section 2201 of this title, with respect to any one or more of the following materials within the State (1) byproduct materials as defined in section 2014(e)(1) of this title;
(2) byproduct materials as defined in section 2014(e)(2) of this title;
(3) source materials;
(4) special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass.

Id.
64. No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall provide for
discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of (1) the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility;
(2) the export from or import into the United States of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material, or of any production or utilization facility;
(3) the disposal into the ocean or sea of byproduct, source, or special nuclear waste
materials as defined in regulations or orders of the Commission;
(4) the disposal of such other byproduct, source, or special nuclear material as the
Commission determines by regulation or order should, because of the hazards or
potential hazards thereof, not be so disposed of without a license from the
Commission.
Id. § 2021(e).
65. For examples of byproduct materials, see Hearings before the Joint Comm. on
Atomic Energy on Federal-StateRelationshipsin the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 303 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Federal-StateRelationships].See also supra notes 1121 and accompanying text.
66. Source material is defined as:
(1) [U]ranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of section 2091 of this title to be source material; or
(2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as
the Commission may by regulation determine from time to time.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2014(z) (West 1973).
67. Special nuclear material is defined as:
(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any
other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 2071 of
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However, subsection 274(c) specifically excludes a major portion of the
NRC's authority from being included in these "turnover agreements"
with the states. Subsection 274(c) provides that the NRC cannot enter
into agreements with the states concerning "the construction and operation of any production6

9

or utilization 70 facility." Subsection 274(c) also

withholds the authority to dispose of nuclear material deemed to be sufficiently hazardous.7 1 This retention of authority by the NRC reflects Congress' strong intent to regulate the safety aspects7 2 of both the operation

of nuclear generating facilities and the high-level waste7 3 generated by
such facilities, in addition to the intent to retain control for purposes of
the common defense and security.74 However, congressional concern for
this title, determines to be special nuclear material . . .; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source material."
Id. § 2014(aa).
68. For a detailed definition of critical mass, see 10 C.F.R. § 150.11 (1983).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1). Production facility is defined as:
(1) any equipment or device determined by rule of the Commission to be capable of
the production of special nuclear material in such quantity as to be of significance to
the common defense and security, or in such manner as to affect the health and
safety of the public; or (2) any important component part especially designed for such
equipment or device as determined by the Commission.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2014(v) (West 1973).
70. Id. § 2021(c)(1). Utilization facility is defined as:
(1) Any equipment or device, except an atomic weapon, determined by rule of the
Commission to be capable of making use of special nuclear material in such quantity
as to be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner as to
affect the health and safety of the public ....
Id. § 2014(cc).
Thus, by excluding a production or utilization facility from being included in a subsection
(b) turnover agreement, the states are precluded under (c) from regulating rtuclear power
plants.
71. These sufficiently hazardous materials include high level radioactive material, so even
in a turnover agreement, according to subsection (b), spent nuclear fuel would not be included. Current legislative history confirms that the "policy of the Federal Government has
always been that the safe disposal of high-level radioactive waste is to be accomplished
under Federal management." 1980 U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEWs 6933, 6934. See also infra
note 132 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
73. Although the scope of this note is confined to high-level waste disposal, Congress has
passed significant legislation concerning state regulation of low-level waste disposal. In 1980
Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat.
3347 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2021b-2021d (West 1973 & Supp. 1984)). See supra
notes 14-17 and accompanying text for definition of low-level radioactive waste. The Act
provides for the complete turnover of low-level waste responsibilities to the states by 1986
provided that the state has entered into an interstate compact with other surrounding
states. Id. § 2021d. For an example of such a compact, see VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-238.6:1
(Cum. Supp. 1983).
For discussion of federal and state responsibilities in relation to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, see Comment, Congressional Recognition of State Authority Over
Nuclear Power and Waste Disposal, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 813, 830 (1982).
74. See Federal-StateRelationships, supra note 65, at 310 (statement of Mr. Lowenstein,
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safety seems to be taken for granted by the NRC.7 5
Subsection 274(k) is the other key link in the nuclear activities preemption controversy. It provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. 7
The statutory construction of subsection (k),77 coupled with Congress'
strong intent to regulate for health and safety reasons, results in the logical conclusion that states or localities are not preempted from regulating
for purposes other than protection against health and safety hazards from
radiation. The legislative history of subsection (k) reveals that
[it] is intended to make it clear that the bill does not impair the State authority to regulate activities of AEC licenses for the manifold health, safety,
and economic purposes other than radiation protection. As indicated elsewhere, the Commission has exclusive authority to regulate for protection
against radiation hazards until such time as the State enters into an agreement with the Commission to assume such responsibility.78
At least one other section of the Act reveals an express provision that
allows for retention of traditionally broad authority by state and local
79
governments over the regulation of public utilities.
Office of the Attorney General).
75. In spite of major nuclear accidents such as Three Mile Island and a leak at the Hanford disposal site in Washington State in which over 155,000 gallons of high-level waste were
missing from containers, NRC findings show that the disposal of high-level waste is both
feasible and reasonably safe:
(1) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that safe disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel in a mined geologic repository is technically feasible ....
(3) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that high-level radioactive waste and
spent fuel will be managed in a safe manner until sufficient repository capacity is
available to assure the safe disposal of all high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel.
(4) The Commission finds reasonable assurances that, if necessary, spent fuel can be
stored safely and without significant environmental effects for at least 30 years beyond the expiration of reactor operating licensees at reactor spent-fuel storage basins,
or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.
(5) The Commission finds reasonable assurances that safe independent onsite or offsite spent fuel storage will be available if such storage capacity is needed.
Rulemaking on the Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 2 NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) T
30,788.02 at 30, 816 (June 20, 1983) (emphasis added).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 111-18..
78. S.REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2872, 2882-83.

79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the
authority or regulations of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the generation,
sale or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed
by the Commission.") In 1965, the following amendment was added to § 2018: "Provided,
That this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State or local agency any
authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2018
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Preemption Analysis of Section 274

Public utilities traditionally have been controlled by state and local
governments. The "franchise to operate a public utility . . . is a special
privilege which . . . may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the
State. ' 80 Accordingly, since "Congress legislated here in a field which the
states have traditionally occupied . . . we start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the State were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' In analyzing the plain words of section 274, there is neither a
provision that mandates construction of a nuclear generating facility by
the states or localities nor a provision compelling them to provide waste
disposal sites. In reviewing the legislative history of section 274, the question of express preemption was considered and specifically rejected by
both the AEC and Congress.82 Congress preferred to adopt a purposefully
vague statute which would tend to cover all the "gray areas" not specifically included in the statute.8 3 The testimony of Robert Lowenstein, of
the Office of General Counsel, AEC, indicates that,
[w]e thought that this act without saying in so many words did make clear
that there is [an area of] preemption here, but we have tried to avoid defining the precise extent of that preemption, feeling that it is better to leave
80. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 278 U.S. 515, 534 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoted in Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
103 S. Ct. 1713, 1723 (1983)).
81. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).
82. In the hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Mr. Lowenstein, an
attorney for the AEC, was questioned specifically as to the preemptive effect of § 2021:
Mr. Toll: On that question [regulation of nuclear materials through interstate commerce], and also on the question of reactors, does this bill go far enough? Does it
really clear the air as to whether or not the States have authority to license reactors
and control shipments in interstate commerce? Should there be a statement that
these activities are expressly preempted to the Federal Government?
Mr. Lowenstein: Under this bill which gives explicit reference to the interests of the
Federal and State Governments, we think it would be fairly apparent, as many of us
now believe under the existing Atomic Energy Act, that there has been an area of
preemption. We considered the desirability of writing the kind of provision you suggest, Mr. Toll, and we decided against it, primarily for the reason that it is practically
impossible to try to define, taking into account all of the various gray areas and special circumstances that might arise, where these areas of preemption should begin or
end.
See Federal-StateRelationships, supra note 65, at 307.
83. The testimony of Mr. Lowenstein of the Office of General Counsel, AEC, regarding §
274(k) reveals that
Subsection (k) is included in order to provide formal statutory recognition of the fact
that even with respect to the reserved areas which the Commission would continue to
regulate, and which to some extent would be preempted from State regulation, nonetheless the States have a very real interest in these activities.
Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
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these kinds
of detailed questions perhaps up to the courts later to be
8 4
resolved.

Even though the AEC and Congress intended the courts to define the
precise extent of federal preemption, there is evidence that an overall
preemptive effect was desired. s5 However, Congress is precluded from
preempting state authority to regulate those matters that do not concern
the protection against radiation hazards."' Due to section 274's purposefully vague construction and legislative history, a large gray area is left
open as to whether a state or locality may enact a law that ultimately
affects an AEC licensee's essential operation, even though the law was
enacted for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.
Nonetheless, a few basic conclusions concerning section 274's preemptive
effect may be articulated: 1) express preemption of state and local law
was not intended;8 7 2) an overall scheme of preemption was desired; ss 3)
the state's traditional power to regulate public utilities was to remain intact provided that the federal government retained control over protection against radiation hazards;8 4) the gray area of state involvement was
to be narrowly construed but interpreted in light of subsection 274(k)'s
"purposes other than radiation" clause; 90 and 5) the precise extent of federal preemption was to be left to the courts to be resolved later.9'
D.

The Courts Speak

1. The Northern States Decision
The leading court decision concerning the scope of state regulation over
nuclear generating facilities is Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota.92
84. Id. at 308.
85. A comment by the joint committee indicates that Section 274 did not intend
to leave any room for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by States to
control radiation hazards by regulating byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials. The intent is to have the material regulated and licensed either by the Commission, or by the State and local governments, but not by both.
S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2872, 2879.
86. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
91. See supra text accompanying note 84.
92. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). It is interesting to
note that seven years before the Northern States decision, the California Supreme Court in
Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 61
Cal. 2d 126, -,
390 P.2d 200, 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432, 436 (1964) held that § 2021 had not
entirely preempted state authority to regulate location of atomic reactors when those regulations are based upon safety measures enacted for purposes other than the protection against
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For many states and localitites, the Northern States decision dealt a seri93
ous blow to attempts to regulate hazardous radioactive materials.
The issue presented to the Northern States court was whether the
NRC "had the exclusive authority to regulate the radioactive water releases from nuclear power plants so as to preclude Minnesota from exercising any regulatory authority over the release of such discharges
. .. .,,Inaffirming the decision of the district court,9 5 the appellate
court declared that Minnesota was preempted from exercising any regulatory powers over the Northern States nuclear power plant.96 After finding
that Congress exercised valid constitutional authority to regulate nuclear
energy, the court stated that no provision in the Atomic Energy Act expressly preempted state authority to regulate radiation emissions from
nuclear power plants. 9 7 Additionally, the court articulated four key fac-

tors in determining whether Congress had impliedly preempted state
authority:
(1)[T]he aim and intent of Congress as revealed by the statute itself and its
legislative history ... ; (2) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
scheme as authorized and directed by the legislation. . .; (3) the nature of
the subject matter regulated and whether it is one which demands "exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to national interests". . .; and (4) "whether, under the circumstances of [a] particular case,
[state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."9 "

The court, basing its conclusion on the premise that Minnesota was preempted from asserting any regulatory control whatsoever, absent a turnover agreement as provided by section 274(b), determined that Congress
had impliedly preempted regulation by Minnesota under any or all of
these factors. 9 It indicated that "the mere enactment of elaborate and
radiation hazards.
93. A majority of cases regarding the scope of state involvement in the nuclear field have
tended to follow the precedent set by Northern States closely. "Nuclear preemption cases
that have reached the courts subsequent to Northern States have followed the case very
closely, especially its reading of the legislative history." Comment, State Regulation of Nuclear Power: Facing the Preemption Challenge from a New Perspective, 76 Nw. U.L. Rv.
134, 156 (1981). But see Meek, Nuclear Power and State Radiation Protection Measures:
The Importance of Preemption, 10 ENVTL. L. 1, 7-9 n.25 (1979) (Courts have been following
Northern States with the deference accorded a Supreme Court case. This should no longer
be the rule because, according to Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977), a summary affirmation is only an agreement by the Supreme Court on the lower court's decision and not on
the rationale used by the lower court.).
94. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1144.
95. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970).
96. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1154.
97. Id. at 1147.
98. Id. at 1146-47 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 1152-53.
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detailed legislation .. .in itself evinces an inescapable implication that
the federal government possessed exclusive authority absent the agreements authorized by the 1959 amendment."' 00 The court also, unfortunately, interpreted section 274(k) as being applicable only when the
states had entered into a turnover agreement with the federal government. 10 1 However, this10 restriction
on 274(k) has been specifically rejected
2
by at least one court.
Close scrutiny of the Northern States opinion makes clear that the
court's reading of section 274(k) is, at least, questionable. As mentioned
above, section 274(k) indicates that "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency to regulate
activities for the purposes other than the protection against radiation
hazards.'' 3 However, in restating this section, the court indicated that
"[t]he only logically acceptable reason for inclusion of subsection (k)...
was to make it clear that Congress was not by subsection (c) . . . inany
way further limiting the power of the states to regulate activities, other
than radiation hazards ...."o104 It is evident from this statement that
the Northern States court recognized the radiological/nonradiological dichotomy of section 274(k), but nevertheless neglected to incorporate the
purpose of the Minnesota statute into its analysis. A portion of section
274's legislative history indicates that a purpose inquiry should be
made.' 1 Therefore, by looking only to the statute's effect, the court
thwarted Minnesota's attempt to regulate an industry it has traditionally
controlled. A majority of decisions subsequent to Northern States have
followed its radiological/nonradiological dichotomy of section 274 and
have neglected to look to the underlying purpose of the state or local
statute.'06
100. Id. at 1150.
101. Id. at 1149-50.
102. See, e.g., Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 580 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 464 (1982). ("[R]egardless of whether or not a state has entered into a §
2021(b) agreement with the Commission, the state retains its authority to regulate nonradiation hazards."). Although a majority of the courts hold that states retain regulation
over nonradiological matters absent a turnover agreement, the Northern States general
analysis is still followed.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976) (emphasis added).
104. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1150 (emphasis added).
105. For example in the absence of [regulation of radiation hazards], the Courts might
have greater latitude in sustaining certain types of zoning requirements which have
purposes other than control of radiation hazards, even though such requirements
might have an incidental effect upon the use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear
material, licenses by the Commission.
Federal-StateRelationships, supra note 65, at 500 (emphasis added). Even though the
NorthernStates court stated in passing that Minnesota was attempting to regulate for radiation purposes, it did not include the purpose of the statute in its framework of analysis.
106. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee v. National Resources Defense Fund, 435 U.S. 519 (1978);
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109
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In another line of decisions, courts have expressed a greater willingness
to look to the purpose of the state or local statute to determine if it was
enacted for purposes other than regulation of radiation hazards. In Marshall v. Consumers Power Co.,' 07 the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed
a lower court decision holding that Michigan could not regulate nuclear
generating facilities for either radiological or nonradiological matters. The
Marshall court indicated that Congress recognized the states' traditional
role in protecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens and was
careful not to interfere with state authority over nonradiological
problems.' The court ultimately held that Michigan could prohibit the
construction and operation of the nuclear power plant if the state did so
for nonradiological purposes. 109 This view is consistent with both the
modern trend of judicial decisions and current congressional legislation." 0
2. The Supreme Court Draws a Firm Line
The most recent Supreme Court decision seems to draw a firm line,
much to the frustration of some states and localities, as to what aspects of
nuclear energy a state may regulate. In Pacific Gas & Electric v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,"' the Supreme Court affirmed a court of appeals decision1 2 upholding the validity
of a California statute "I which imposed a moratorium on the construc(D.C. Cir. 1971); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 Ill. 3d 800, 284
N.E.2d 342 (1972); Van Dissel v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 152 N.J. Super. 391, 377
A.2d 1244 (1977); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,
133 N.J. Super. 375, 336 A.2d 750 (1975), rev'd, 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976).
107. 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1976).
108. Id. at -,
237 N.W.2d at 276. According to the court, regulation over nonradiological matters included, among other things, "zoning, local pollution, building and equipment
codes on nonradiation machinery and working conditions of plant employees." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
109. Id. at -,
237 N.W.2d at 277 ("We read Northern States as holding that state
control over construction and operation is prohibited only as to radiation hazards.").
110. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee, 677 F.2d 571 (AEA has expressly and impliedly preempted
regulation by states only for purposes of radiation hazards associated with nuclear materials.); South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982) (court upheld
South Dakota's refusal to allow FERC to build a nuclear plant based upon economic considerations); Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659
F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983) (upholding a California statute enacted for economic purposes imposing a moratorium on the construction of nuclear power
plants). See also NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295, 94 Stat.
780 (states are allowed to impose regulations relating to land use and siting requirements for
nuclear power plants provided the regulations are identical to or more stringent than federal
regulations). See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
111. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
112. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conversation & Dev. Comm'n, 659
F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
113. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982).
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tion of nuclear power plants. The Court found that the statute was enacted pursuant to the state's economic powers over nuclear wastes as opposed to the protection against health and safety hazards due to
radiation.
The Court held that Congress "intended that the federal government
should regulate the radiological aspects involved in the construction and
operation of a nuclear power plant, but that the states retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, cost and other related state concerns." 114 The Court agreed with the court of appeals' finding that the
"uncertainties in the nuclear fuel cycle [i.e., problems concerning a permanent solution to nuclear waste disposal] make nuclear power an uneconomical and uncertain source of energy" 1 5 and stated that the NRC's
regulatory authority is not based upon economic considerations. 11 6 Despite argument by Pacific Gas and Electric that the economic reasons for
the enactment of the statute were mere pretexts, 7 the Court refused to
attempt to ascertain California's "true motive" and upheld the statute."l s
E. Application of Principles to Louisa County's Attempt to Regulate
Nuclear Waste Disposal
Under the principles articulated in the Northern States decision,"" the
Louisa County ordinance'" on appeal would probably be declared uncon114. Pacific Gas & Electric, 103 S. Ct. at 1723.
115. Id. at 1720 (citing Pacific Legal Found., 659 F.2d at 925).
116. Pacific Gas & Electric, 103 S. Ct. at 1724. See also 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1983).
117. Pacific Gas & Electric argued that the law was actually intended to protect against
radiation hazards, but this intent was disguised as an economic consideration.
118. The Court dismissed Pacific Gas & Electric's pretext arguments for two reasons: 1)
motive inquiry is futile because it is too difficult to determine which legislator voted for
what reason, and 2) motive inquiry is pointless when states are given the authority to regulate nuclear power plants for nonradiological purposes. Pacific Gas & Electric, 103 S. Ct. at
1728.
119. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
120. A number of states have passed laws concerning the regulation of nuclear generating
facilities and nuclear waste disposal. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-11-202 (Repl. Vol.
1982) ("Disposal of any radioactive waste which originates or has been used outside this
state and has not been used in this state is prohibited ....
"); HAWAII CONST. art. XI § 8
(Supp. 1982) ("No nuclear fission plant shall be constructed or radioactive material disposed
of in the state without the prior approval of a 2/3 vote in each house of the legislature.");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-3-302(1) (1981) ("No person may dispose of large quantities of radioactive material, byproduct material or special nuclear material within the State of Montana."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125:77-6 (Repl. Vol. 1977 & Supp. 1982) (No person shall
receive, store or dispose of radioactive waste in the state or within the coastal jurisdiction of
the state. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to prohibit the on-site storage of
spent nuclear fuel rods nor in any way [conflict with the AEC] provided however, under no
circumstances shall spent nuclear fuel rods from any other plant or storage facility be
received for on-site storage.) (emphasis added); OR. REV. STAT. § 469.525 (1981).
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stitutional because, in effect, it regulates the construction and operation
of VEPCO's nuclear power plant. However, Pacific Gas & Electric indicates that the purpose of the statute must be determined before federal
preemption can be found. The Louisa County Board of Supervisors'
"honest and legitimate" concerns are, according to an internal VEPCO
memorandum, based substantially upon economic considerations.121 This
would seem to legitimize Louisa County's attempt to regulate nuclear
waste disposal. However, dicta from the Supreme Court in Pacific Gas &
Electric indicates that a state or locality cannot regulate the construction
and operation12 2 of a nuclear generating facility even if the state statute is
purportedly enacted for purposes other than the protection against radiation hazards. 123 The Court is drawing a firm line, allowing the state to
decide, based upon nonradiological purposes, i.e., actual need and economic considerations, whether nuclear power plants will be built. However, once state authorization to build has been obtained, the federal government, without interference from state or local governments, regulates
how nuclear power plants will be constructed and maintained." There121. Those considerations are
1. Ability to safely transport fuel [drain on county resources in the event of an
accident involving transportation of spent nuclear fuel];
2. Effect on North Anna of Surry fuel storage [shipment of Surry fuel may reduce
the operating life of North Anna; this in turn would cause a premature closing which
would mean the loss of tax revenue and jobs];
3. Possibility of Louisa County becoming a site for national storage and reprocessing [damage County's reputation for having an unspoiled environment and diminishing its ability to attract new industry and residents];
4. Being squeezed by State and Federal governments into solving a problem not of
their making [Louisa County should not be forced by federal government to assume a
responsibility for solving a spent fuel storage problem it did not create].
See Brief of Appellants at 3-4, Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Louisa County, Va., No. 831241 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 1983) (discussing a memorandum from J.H. Ferguson, then VEPCO's
Executive Vice-President, to J.J. Oatts, a VEPCO Senior Vice President (Jan. 15, 1982)).
122. The construction and operation of a nuclear power plant has been construed by
courts as necessarily involving the disposal of nuclear waste. See, e.g., Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1153 (8th Cir. 1971) ("[R]egulation of the radioactive effluents discharged from a nuclear power plant is inextricably intertwined with the
planning, construction and entire operation of the facility."); Harris County v. United
States, 292 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961) (NRC authority to regulate byproduct materials includes authority to license the handling of radioactive waste). See also Federal-State Relationships, supra note 65, at 306.
123. At the outset, we emphasize that the statute does not seek to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear power plant. It would clearly be impermissible for California to attempt to do so, for such regulation, even if enacted out of non-safety
concerns, would nevertheless directly conflict with the NRC's exclusive authority over
plant construction and operation.
Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct.
1713, 1726 (1983) (emphasis added).
124. See also Utility Consumers Council v. Public Service Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688, 698
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("The federal government regulates how nuclear power plants will be
constructed and maintained; the State . . . regulates whether they will be constructed.")
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fore, in implementing the radiological/nonradiological dichotomy that
section 274(k) compels, the Court is restricting the states' responsibility
by limiting their authority to the decision of whether nuclear power is
necessary or economically feasible. This decision, while providing a clear
line of preemptive authority, is inconsistent with the statutory construction of section 274(k) and recent federal legislation.
1.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act

On January 7, 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(NWPA). 1 25 This important piece of legislation adds yet another component to the complex issue of federal preemption of state regulation in the
nuclear energy industry. The Act provides, for the first time, a comprehensive federal policy regarding the disposition of high-level nuclear
waste. The Act acknowledges that the problem concerning nuclear waste
disposal1 26 is near a crisis level and that both Congress and the NRC are
primarily responsible for the widespread skepticism regarding the federal
policy on nuclear waste. 27 The NWPA sets forth a comprehensive plan
for the location and development of permanent disposal sites for highlevel nuclear waste. 28 The NWPA also provides a plan, although not as
comprehensive as its scheme for permanent waste disposal, for interim
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
125. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2206 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-10226
(West 1983)).
126. "The Congress finds that ... (2) a national problem has been created by the accumulation of (A) spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors; and (B) radioactive waste from
(i) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; (ii) activities related to medical research, diagnosis,
and treatment; and (iii) other sources." 42 U.S.C.A. § 10131(a) (West 1983).
127. Concerning the NRC's inability to cope with the problem of nuclear waste, the legislative history of the NWPA indicates that
[i]n 1979, the D.C. Court of Appeals chastised the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in
Minnesota v. NRC for relying on apparently shallow technical evidence in reading its
general determination that it could continue to license reactor operations - and, specifically at issue in the case, expansion of spent fuel storage at reactor sites - based
on its "reasonable assurances" that disposal facilities would be available for nuclear
wastes when needed. Stopping short of contradicting the Commission's confidence,
the court recommended that NRC review its basis for this confidence .... The ensuing NRC "waste confidence" review continues to this day with no conclusive determination having been reached on the issue.
H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3792, 3794.

Concerning Congress' inability to cope with nuclear waste disposal, the legislative history
reveals that the "[flailures in the Federal repository development program, the collapse of
the domestic spent fuel reprocessing industry and quickly deteriorating public confidence in
our ability to deal safely with nuclear waste, together with other critical safety and economic
issues, were seriously undermining the strength of the domestic nuclear industry." H.R.
REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3792, 3794-95.
128. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 10131-10145 (West 1983).
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spent fuel storage. 1 9 The preemptive effect of the NWPA has yet to be
interpreted by the judiciary; however, its possible effects on state and local regulation of nuclear waste disposal may be significant.
a. Express Preemption
There is no provision in the NWPA that expressly prohibits state and
local governments from enacting legislation affecting nuclear waste disposal. Indeed, the idea of express preemption was specifically adopted by
the Senate but was rejected by the House of Representatives.'" Other
legislative history makes it evident that express preemption of state and
local authority to regulate nuclear waste disposal, while considered, was
not intended. 131
b. Implied Preemption Regarding Permanent Waste Disposal
The NWPA expressly indicates that permanent disposal of nuclear
waste is the federal government's responsibility." 2 While states are spe129. Id. §§ 10151-10157.
130. The amendment proposed by Senator McClure would, in effect, override state siting
laws for nuclear power plants and would force immediate judgments in favor of the NRC's
"waste confidence" review. See 128 CONG. REc. S4310 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1982). However,
the House of Representatives rejected this amendment. The statements of Congressman Ottinger indicate his belief that "it is crucial to the success of the [NWDA] that the states are
given strong participation rights ... ." 128 CONG. REc. H8795 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1982). Rep.
Ottinger also stated after the defeat of the McClure amendment that
I am particularly pleased that this bill contains no findings or provisions which could
preempt State or Federal laws . . .by a Congressional determination that there is
reasonable assurance that a safe disposal method currently exists. There is no such
determination, and such findings which were originally included in the bill were deleted to insure that there be no preemption.
Id. at H8797 (noted in Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1730 (1983)). See also Nuclear Waste Disposal Policy: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 553-54 (1982) (statement of Brooks Yeager, Sierra Club).
131. A Senate Report indicates that Congress was aware of specific legislation of localities
to block the transshipment of spent nuclear fuel, yet it did not expressly preempt such local
legislation. The Senate Report indicates that
[t]here is growing opposition to fuel transshipments between reactor basins. . . .[If
transshipments are interstate or intercounty, there may be local objections such as
the ordinance adopted by the Board of Supervisors of Louisa County, Virginia, effectively banning the transshipment of spent fuel from the Virginia Electric & Power
Company's Surry Plant to its North Anna Plant.
Brief of Appellants at 32, Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Louisa County, Va., No. 83-1241
(4th Cir. Mar. 4, 1983) (citing S. REP. No. 282, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981)).
132. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 10131(a)(4) (West 1983) ("[T]he Federal Government has the
responsibility to provide for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste and such
spent nuclear fuel as may be disposed of in order to protect the public health and safety and
the environment .... ");id. § 10131(b)(2) (The purpose of the NWPA is to "establish the
Federal responsibility, and a definite Federal policy, for the disposal of such waste and
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cifically encouraged to coordinate their efforts with the federal government to find a solution to the high-level waste problem,'13 3 the burden for
ultimately adopting and implementing such measures falls exclusively on
the federal government." 4 Accordingly, the NWPA provides strong evidence that the federal government had a clear and unambiguous intent"35
to establish a "scheme of regulation" whereby state and local governments are preempted from regulating the permanent disposal of high8
level nuclear waste."1
c.

Implied Preemption Regarding Interim Waste Disposal

The NWPA, in its statement of purposes, expresses the intent "to define the relationship between the Federal Government and State governments with respect to the disposal of such waste and spent fuel .. ..
However, the NWPA indicates that "the generators and owners of highlevel radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have the primary responsibility to provide for, and the responsibility to pay the costs of, the interim
storage of such waste and spent fuel . . ,,138 This provision of the
NWPA implies that the federal government has limited involvement concerning interim storage disposal.
The federal government's extent of involvement concerning interim
storage is to provide a limited amount of storage, in preexisting federal
interim storage facilities, for utilities that have expended available storage space at their own on-site storage facility."39 However, interim storage
will only be available to those utilities that have pursued, with due diligence, other alternatives. 1 0 The alternatives to be diligently pursued include: expansion of on-site storage facilities, construction of new on-site
storage facilities, acquisition of modular or mobile spent fuel storage
equipment, and transshipment to another civilian nuclear power reactor."1 Accordingly, state or local laws which hinder or make impossible
the utilities' attempt to diligently pursue these alternatives, which include transshipment to another power plant, may be viewed as conflicting
with federal policy and therefore be preempted. However, there is evidence in the NWPA which indicates that these alternatives only need be
attempted and not specifically implemented. The NWPA clearly indicates
spent fuel.").
133. See, e.g., id. § 10131(a)(6); id. § 10136.
134. See supra note 132.
135. See supra text accompanying note 81.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10131(b)(3) (West 1983).
138. Id. § 10131(a)(5).
139. See id. § 10155(a)(1).
140. Id. § 10155(b)(1)(A), (B).
141. Id. § 10155(b)(1)(B).
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that, in considering the availability of each alternative, there should be a
conscious effort to seek to minimize the transportation of spent nuclear
fuel. 142 Additionally, in weighing these various alternatives, the Commission will take into account a multitude of factors, including "local and
state ordinances limiting the expansion or addition of storage capacity'or
transshipment." 43 These considerations, when coupled with Congress'
specific knowledge of state and local laws which would render the implementation of the alternatives impossible,' 4 indicate that these alternatives need only be pursued and not implemented before federal interim
storage will be made available.
Finally, the states are given broad veto power with respect to the location of interim storage sites.1 45 Accordingly, it appears that while the
NWPA provides clear and manifest intent to preempt state and local law
concerning permanent nuclear waste disposal, the intent to preempt state
or local law regarding interim waste storage is far less clear.
2.

Commerce Clause

The commerce clause is one of Congress' sources of constitutional
power to regulate in the nuclear energy field.1 4 1 Storage and disposal of
nuclear waste are viewed by courts as activities that fall under the auspices of the commerce clause. 47 As indicated above, the Louisa County
ordinance would effectively ban the storage of all waste not generated
within its borders. 48 In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,'49 the Supreme
Court struck down a New Jersey statute that prohibited the importation
of solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside of the
state.1 50 According to the New Jersey statute, waste originated or collected within New Jersey could be disposed of inside the state. The Court
142. Id. § 10155(a)(3) ("In selecting methods of providing storage capacity ... the Secre).
tary ... shall seek to minimize the transportation of spent nuclear fuel ....
143. 48 Fed. Reg. 19382, 19384 (1983) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 53), cited in Brief of
Appellants at 37, Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Louisa County, Va., No. 83-1241 (4th Cir.
Mar. 4, 1983). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 10108 (West 1983).
144. See supra note 108.
145. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10155(d) (West 1983).
146. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1982). ("The efficient disposal of wastes is as much a part of economic activity as the production that yields
the waste as a byproduct, and to impede the interstate movement of those wastes is as
inconsistent with the efficient allocation of resources as to impede the interstate movement
of the product that yields them."); Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928, 933 (E.D. Wash. 1981) ("[A] common sense view of the facts
• . . support[s] a determination that the movement of radioactivity in interstate commerce
fits within the definition of 'commerce' for constitutional purposes.").
148. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
149. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
150. Id. at 628.
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cifically encouraged to coordinate their efforts with the federal government to find a solution to the high-level waste problem, 13 3 the burden for
ultimately adopting and implementing such measures falls exclusively on
the federal government.13 4 Accordingly, the NWPA provides strong evi35
dence that the federal government had a clear and unambiguous intent
to establish a "scheme of regulation" whereby state and local governments are preempted from regulating the permanent disposal of high13 6
level nuclear waste.
c.

Implied Preemption Regarding Interim Waste Disposal

The NWPA, in its statement of purposes, expresses the intent "to define the relationship between the Federal Government and State governments with respect to the disposal of such waste and spent fuel. ....,,137
However, the NWPA indicates that "the generators and owners of highlevel radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have the primary responsibility to provide for, and the responsibility to pay the costs of, the interim
storage of such waste and spent fuel .... ,,131
This provision of the
NWPA implies that the federal government has limited involvement concerning interim storage disposal.
The federal government's extent of involvement concerning interim
storage is to provide a limited amount of storage, in preexisting federal
interim storage facilities, for utilities that have expended available storage space at their own on-site storage facility."39 However, interim storage
will only be available to those utilities that have pursued, with due diligence, other alternatives. 4° The alternatives to be diligently pursued include: expansion of on-site storage facilities, construction of new on-site
storage facilities, acquisition of modular or mobile spent fuel storage
equipment, and transshipment to another civilian nuclear power reactor."'' Accordingly, state or local laws which hinder or make impossible
the utilities' attempt to diligently pursue these alternatives, which include transshipment to another power plant, may be viewed as conflicting
with federal policy and therefore be preempted. However, there is evidence in the NWPA which indicates that these alternatives only need be
attempted and not specifically implemented. The NWPA clearly indicates
spent fuel.").
133. See, e.g., id. § 10131(a)(6); id. § 10136.
134. See supra note 132.
135. See supra text accompanying note 81.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10131(b)(3) (West 1983).
138. Id. § 10131(a)(5).
139. See id. § 10155(a)(1).
140. Id. § 10155(b)(1)(A), (B).

141. Id. § 10155(b)(1)(B).
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that, in considering the availability of each alternative, there should be a
conscious effort to seek to minimize the transportation of spent nuclear
fuel. " 2 Additionally, in weighing these various alternatives, the Commission will take into account a multitude of factors, including "local and
state ordinances limiting the expansion or addition of storage capacity'or
transshipment."'' These considerations, when coupled with Congress'
specific knowledge of state and local laws which would render the implementation of the alternatives impossible,"' indicate that these alternatives need only be pursued and not implemented before federal interim
storage will be made available.
Finally, the states are given broad veto power with respect to the location of interim storage sites. 145 Accordingly, it appears that while the
NWPA provides clear and manifest intent to preempt state and local law
concerning permanent nuclear waste disposal, the intent to preempt state
or local law regarding interim waste storage is far less clear.
2.

Commerce Clause

The commerce clause is one of Congress' sources of constitutional
power to regulate in the nuclear energy field. " 6 Storage and disposal of
nuclear waste are viewed by courts as activities that fall under the auspices of the commerce clause.1 7 As indicated above, the Louisa County
ordinance would effectively ban the storage of all waste not generated
within its borders.'" In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,' 9 the Supreme
Court struck down a New Jersey statute that prohibited the importation
of solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside of the
state. 150 According to the New Jersey statute, waste originated or collected within New Jersey could be disposed of inside the state. The Court
142. Id. § 10155(a)(3) ("In selecting methods of providing storage capacity ... the Secretary ...

shall seek to minimize the transportation of spent nuclear fuel . .

").

143. 48 Fed. Reg. 19382, 19384 (1983) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 53), cited in Brief of
Appellants at 37, Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Louisa County, Va., No. 83-1241 (4th Cir.
Mar. 4, 1983). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 10108 (West 1983).
144. See supra note 108.
145. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10155(d) (West 1983).
146. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1982). ("The efficient disposal of wastes is as much a part of economic activity as the production that yields
the waste as a byproduct, and to impede the interstate movement of those wastes is as
inconsistent with the efficient allocation of resources as to impede the interstate movement
of the product that yields them."); Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928, 933 (E.D. Wash. 1981) ("[A] common sense view of the facts
-..
support[s] a determination that the movement of radioactivity in interstate commerce
fits within the definition of 'commerce' for constitutional purposes.").
148. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
149. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
150. Id. at 628.
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Utilizing the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act

The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act 1 7 transferred the NRC's
responsibility to regulate radioactive air emissions to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).168 This transfer was deemed necessary by Congress because of the NRC's lack of priority for environmental concerns.16 9
The initial strength of possible state regulation lies within the definitional
change of air pollutant as defined in section 302(g). This section indicates
that "[t]he term 'air pollutant' means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct
material) substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters
the ambient air.' 17 Section 116 provides that "nothing in this chapter
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision
thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting
emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirements respecting control or

abatement of air pollution.

.

. . 1'

This definitional change, in combina-

tion with the broad powers which states currently possess under section
116, seems to provide state and local governments with the authority to
indirectly regulate both nuclear power plants and disposal sites. 172 Thus,
subject to certain limitations,' 7 3 state and local governments may enact
radioactive air emission standards that are equivalent to, or more stringent than, federal government standards. The legislative history of the
1977 amendments reveals that states and localities would not be preempted from enacting such legislation even if it imposed significant burwould be forced to close down. Richmond News Leader, Oct. 10, 1983, § A at 13, col. 4. One
author has noted that "[more than 20% of the U.S. population had had the opportunity to
vote on the need for nuclear energy ... and they have affirmed it by a 2-1 landslide." [1976
Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 986.
167. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
168. See Hearings on ReorganizationPlan No. 3 Before the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970).

169. One of the principal reasons the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce transferred this authority to the EPA was the fact that "[t]he Committee also felt
that NRC's primary function was to license nuclear plant siting and construction, with environmental concerns being of secondary importance." EPA Receives Authority to Regulate
Radioactive Effluents, [1964-1981 Transfer Binder Current Developments] NUCLEAR REG.
REP. (CCH) T 20,064 (Oct. 24, 1977).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (Supp. V 1981).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. IV 1981).
172. See, e.g., Davis, Kartuck, Leape & Magill, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977:
Away From Technology-Forcing?,2 HARv. EN'r'L L. REv. 1 (1977); Meek, Nuclear Power
and State Radiation Protection Measures: The Impotence of Preemption, 10 ENVTL. L. 1,
24-30 (1979); Stensvaag, State Regulation of Nuclear GeneratingPlants Under the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 514, 533 (1982).
173. See Stensvaag, supra note 172, at 538.
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dens on AEC licensees. 74
Judicial response, however, has not been particularly favorable to states
which have attempted to rely on the Clean Air Act as a means of regulating the nuclear energy industry. The court in Illinois v. General Electric
Co.175 declared the Illinois Spent Fuel Act unconstitutional based upon

supremacy and commerce clause grounds. As an alternative, Illinois argued that the authority given to the states by the 1977 amendments to
the Clean Air Act authorized Illinois to restrict the disposal of nuclear
waste as Illinois saw fit.'76 This argument failed for several reasons. The
court held 1) that the Clean Air Act did not purport to limit federal powers under other statutes such as the Atomic Energy Act; 2) that the I11inois Spent Fuel Act contained no provision for regulating or controlling
radioactive air pollution; 3) that the effect of the Spent Fuel Act may be
to reduce radioactive air emissions, but that reduction was not the Illinois
statute's purpose; and 4) that there was no evidence presented to prove
that the disposal of nuclear waste in the state would emit radioactivity
into the air.7
Thus, according to the General Electric court, a state or local law that
imposes legitimate radioactive air emission standards on AEC licensees
will probably be upheld. The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act are a
valid source of state and local regulation in the nuclear field that have
been virtually overlooked.
IV.

7 8

TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WASTES: FEDERAL AND STATE

REGULATIONS INVALIDATE THE SPOTSYLVANIA

COUNTY ORDINANCE

Storage of nuclear wastes, specifically of spent fuel rods, will inevitably
174. Under this provision, radioactive pollutants, including source material, special nuclear material and byproduct material are covered by Section 116 of the Clean Air
Act. Thus, any State, or political subdivision thereof, may establish standards more
stringent than Federal, or where a Federal standards [sic] has not been established,
may establish any standards they deem appropriate. Thus the provision would not
preempt States and localities from setting and enforcing stricter air pollution standards for radiation than the Federal standards, and would not follow the holding of
Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota in the context of radioactive air
pollution.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 143, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1502, 1523-24 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
175. 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).
176. Id. at 215.
177. Id. at 215-16.
178. However, some states have enacted radiation air emission statutes. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-7-103 (Repl. Vol. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN- § 125-6 (1977 Repl. Vol. &
Supp. 1981). Virginia has established the Air Pollution Control Board. See VA. CODE ANN. §
10-17.11 (Repl. Vol. 1978). However, Virginia has yet to include radioactive emissions in its
definition of "air pollutant."
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involve transporting those wastes from power generating stations to storage facilities. Unlike the issue of where to store high-level wastes, the issues surrounding transportation of those wastes will not be resolved by
any future establishment of a federal high-level waste repository.
This part of the note will discuss the system of federal regulation of the
transportation of nuclear wastes, the regulations and monitoring structure of the Commonwealth of Virginia, the extent of transportation of
nuclear wastes in Virginia, the potential hazards involved, the Spotsylvania County ordinance purporting to regulate shipments of nuclear materials through the county, and finally, the interaction among the three levels
of government in their respective efforts to regulate the transportation of
nuclear wastes.
A.

The Federal Regulatory System

1.

The Source of Power

The commerce clause of the United States Constitution'19 grants to the
federal government regulatory power over interstate commerce. This
grant of authority functions simultaneously as a restriction on state activity in the same area. However, due to the inherent state police power, the
federal and state governments have traditionally shared authority over
transportation.18 0 This concurrent jurisdiction has repeatedly presented
opportunities for courts to engage in balancing the interests of the states
against the interest of the federal government in protecting interstate
commerce. Furthermore, where the federal government has created an extensive regulatory system with an intent to establish national uniformity, 18' there is little room left for state action in the same field."8 2 Such is
the case with transportation of nuclear wastes.
2. The Exercise of Regulatory Authority
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) share authority over transportation of radioactive
materials.1 8 3 NRC derives broad power over civilian nuclear activities
from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.184 The 1959 addition to the Act,
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
180. See generally South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
181. The federal government has recognized the need for national uniformity of production of nuclear energy and transportation of nuclear wastes. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976)).
182. See generally Note, Pre-emption as a PreferentialGround: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
183. Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Memorandum of Understanding, 44 Fed.
Reg. 38,690 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Understanding].
184. Trosten & Ancarrow, Federal-State-LocalRelationships in TransportingRadioac-
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section 274,185 provides a framework within which states may enter into
agreement with the federal government to acquire certain areas of authority previously exercised by the NRC. '86 The inference that section 274
excludes transportation of high-level wastes from those areas which may
be relinquished to the state may be derived from section 274(c)(1), where
it is stated that the NRC "shall retain authority and responsibility with
respect to the regulation of (1) the construction and operation of any production of utilization facility .... ,,187 Testimony from the congressional
hearings prior to the adoption of section 274 supports this inference:
"Under the licenses which we issue for the operation of nuclear reactors,
we would have control over the shipment of any irradiated fuel elements
from the facility to a chemical reprocessing plant. . ."'88
".
Transportation
is seen as being implicit in the meaning of operation."9
The DOT's jurisdiction over transportation of radioactive material is
derived from the Interstate Commerce Commission. 9 ' The Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act (HMTA)' 9 ' vests in the Secretary of DOT
authority to issue and enforce uniform regulations relating to hazardous
materials in all modes of transportation. Section 104 of the HMTA includes radioactive materials as a designated hazardous material. 19' A primary purpose of the HMTA was the codification of regulations of various
modal administrations. 9 ' To this end, the DOT serves as an umbrella for
subdivisions which implement the HMTA: the Coast Guard supervises
transport in navigable waterways, the Federal Railway Administration supervises railroad safety, and the Federal Aviation Administration impletive Materials:Rules of the Nuclear Road, 68 Ky. L.J. 251, 255-56 (1980).
185. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
186. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 724, 73 Stat. 688 (1959), amended by 1970 Reorg.
Plan No. 3, §§ 2(a)(7), 6(2), 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021
(West 1973 & Supp. 1984)).
187. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(c)(1) (emphasis added).
188. Trosten & Ancarrow, supra note 184, at 260 (quoting Hearings Before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, on Federal-StateRelationships in the Atomic Energy Field,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 287, 306 (1959)) (emphasis added).
189. From the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, its legislative history, the regulations,
and the Northern States Power Company case, we conclude that transportation of
nuclear fuel and waste radioactive products to and from a nuclear power plant is
included within the phrase "construction and operation of any ... utilization facility" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2121(c)(1).
Op. Arr'y GEN. CAL. [1981 Transfer Binder] NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 20,129 at 16,765
(Aug. 24, 1979).
190. Trosten & Ancarrow, supra note 184, at 264.
191. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156 (1975)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (1976)).
192. 49 U.S.C. § 1803.
193. Trosten & Ancarrow, supra note 184, at 264-65. Modal refers to the various modes of
transportation, such as rail, motor freight, and air.
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ments HMTA as applied to domestic and international air shipments.""
In an effort to delineate the respective responsibilities in the area of
transportation regulation, the NRC and the DOT entered into a Memorandum of Understanding. 95 This agreement pledges exchange of information, consultation, and assistance between the two agencies. 96 In general, the responsibilities are designated:
The DOT is responsible for regulating safety in transportation of all hazardous materials, including radioactive materials, and the NRC is responsible
for regulating safety in receipt, possession, use, and transfer of by-products
source, and special nuclear materials. The NRC reviews and approves or
denies approval of package designs for fissile materials and for other radioactive materials in quantities exceeding Type A limits, as defined in 10 CFR
Part 71.197
The areas covered by NRC and DOT regulations include classification of
nuclear wastes, 98 pre-notification of state agency requirements,9 9 packaging design and testing, 00 placarding, 2°0 training requirements for driv2
ers of Type B and Type B large quantity cargoes,'
loading and unload20 5
04
203
reporting.
accident
and
ing, routing,
B.

Virginia's Regulatory Scheme

1.

Sources of Power

The tenth amendment to the United States Constitution recognizes
that power not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution,
nor expressly prohibited by it to the states, is reserved for the states. 06
There also exists an inherent state authority to exercise police power, in
promotion of the health and safety of its residents. 0 7 Police power, however, is not accorded unlimited scope when it interferes with interstate
commerce 20 8 or trespasses into a realm of federal regulation.20 9 As noted
194. Id.
195. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 183.
196. Id. at 38,691.
197. Id. at 38,690. Fissile materials include uranium 233, uranium 235, plutonium 238,
plutonium 239, and plutonium 241. 10 C.F.R. § 71.4(e) (1982).
198. 10 C.F.R. § 61.2 (1983) (low-level waste); Id. § 60.2(b)(j) (high-level waste).
199. Id. § 71.5a.
200. Id. §§ 71.1-.42.
201. 49 C.F.R. §§ 172.500-.558 (1982).
202. Id. § 177.825(d).
203. Id. §§ 177.834-.844.
204. Id. § 177.825.
205. Id. § 177.861.
206. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. See also supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
207. See South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
208. See generally Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
209. See generally Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
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above, the federal government has legislated extensively in the field of
transportation of nuclear wastes. 210 As to transportation, congressional intent is clear as to what areas are open for state action.211 Virginia exercises authority in routing,212 economic, non-safety matters,21 3 and moni2 4
toring transportation.
DOT regulations grant to states some discretion as to route designations. 215 Preferred routes for shipping are described as 1) an interstate
highway system for which an alternative route is not designated by a
state routing agency and 2) a state designated route selected by a state
routing agency. 216 The State Board of Health functions as the state routing agency in Virginia, but any routes established by it must be approved
by the NRC. 217 It is doubtful that the state routing agency, or any local
government, could require a designated route to include a mode of transportation other than that of highway. 2 s The "state designated routes"
apply only to highway routes. 21' 9 Furthermore, a recent ruling of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit states that the DOT national scheme
for preferred routes of highway transport of radioactive materials not
only did not have to include alternative modes of transportation to satisfy
its statutory responsibilities, 220 but also that any state designated route
including alternative modes would be inconsistent with DOT routing
221
guidelines.
After an interstate shipment has entered Virginia or after an intrastate
shipment has begun its journey, any variation from the established route
must be approved by the Department of Health 222 and must be "based on
a comparative radiological risk assessment process at least as sensitive as
223
that outlined in the DOT guidelines.
While the discretion allowed to states with regard to routing may seem
210. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
212. This authority exists concurrently with DOT routing requirements. 49 C.F.R. §
177.825 (1982).
213. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
214. Federal regulations requiring advance notification by carriers to states of shipments
of nuclear wastes imply state authority to monitor transportation while the carrier is within
the state. 10 C.F.R. § 71.5a (1983); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.30 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
215. 49 C.F.R. § 177.825 (1982).
216. Id.
217. Telephone interview, supra note 16.
218. For example, in an attempt to avoid transportation of European spent fuel through
the City of Portsmouth, a routing rule might hypothetically include barging out of
Portsmouth.
219. 49 C.F.R. § 171.8 (1976).
220. See City of New York v. Department of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 744 (2d Cir. 1983).
221. 49 C.F.R. § 177, app. A (1981).
222. Telephone interview, supra note 16.
223. 49 C.F.R. § 177, app. A (1982).
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to be strictly limited, it does allow those who are knowledgeable of road
and geographic considerations to participate in the routing process, and
to make quick decisions when alternate routes are needed.
2.

Exercise of Regulatory Authority: Who Does What in Virginia

In an exercise of non-safety economic regulatory power, Virginia has
recently established the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Fund
(Fund).2 2 4 The Fund is created by one-time and annual fees imposed
upon each NRC licensed operative nuclear power facility in the state.
While the Fund will not broaden state regulatory power over transportation, it will expand the monitoring capabilities of state and local agencies
by "establishing, maintaining, and operating . . emergency plans, programs, and capabilities to deal with nuclear accidents," including trans2 25
portation accidents.
Until recently, the State Board of Health depended solely upon NRC
and DOT regulations. However, newly enacted legislation charges the
Board of Health with promulgation of regulations to monitor shipments
within the state.2 6 Pursuant to the state's police power, the Board of
Health issues certificates of transport based on compliance with DOT and
NRC regulations. 22 7 Certificates are necessary for all shipments of Type
22 8
A, B, and B large quantity material.
The Office of Emergency Services (OES) is responsible for monitoring
certain activities. 229 In addition to issuing certificates for transport, the
OES is charged with monitoring carriers while in the state, as well as
formulation and implementation of emergency response plans.2 30 Further,
OES is responsible for dissemination of information concerning future
shipments to the law enforcement agencies of the localities which will be
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.33 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
225. Id.
226. The Coordinator of the Office of Emergency Services, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Health, will maintain a registry of shippers of
hazardous radioactivematerials and monitor the transportation within the Commonwealth of those hazardous radioactive materials, as defined by the Board of Health,
which may constitute a significant potential danger to the citizens of the Commonwealth in the event of accidental spillage or release. The rules and regulations
promulgated by the Board shall not be in conflict with federal statutes, rules, or regulations. Other agencies and commissions of the Commonwealth shall cooperate with
the Board of Health in the formulation of rules and regulations as herein provided.
VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.30 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
227. RERP, supra note 17, at app. 14-7. This is pursuant to authority granted under VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-278.2 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
228. RERP, supra note 17, at app. 14.
229. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.30 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
230. RERP, supra note 17, at app. 14-3.
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affected.23 1 Finally, 0ES is charged with the responsibility for training
local personnel in the use of radiological monitoring and response
2 32
procedures.
In the event of a transportation accident, the primary responsibility of
local governments is to "provide overall response as it affects the general
public."'2 3 This includes immediate notification to the Bureau of Radiological Health, an agency of the Department of Health, and, in the event
of an accident involving military materials, notification to the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center, a federal agency. 234 Because of the
high probability that local officials would be the first to deal with a transportation accident scenario, their role in the transportation of high-level
nuclear wastes is a crucial one.
C. The Approximate Extent of Nuclear Waste Transportation in
Virginia
Radioactive materials may be transported within or through Virginia
by the four transportation modes: air, water, highway, or rail.23 Highway
238
transport is the predominant mode.
There are approximately seventy shipments of hazardous radioactive
materials annually in Virginia.2 37 The percentage of these shipments consisting of nuclear waste is uncertain. Certainly the high-level content nuclear wastes would include weapons material, residue from research reactors, and other fuel cycle wastes. 23 8 In addition to shipments passing
through the state on Interstate 95,230 the port of Portsmouth receives
shipments of spent fuel shipped by sea from Europe, en route to South
Carolina for interim storage.24
231. Id.
232. Id. at app. 14-2.
233. Id. at app. 14-4.
234. Id. at app. 14-1.
235. There is virtually no transport of radioactive materials by rail, air or water in Virginia. Telephone interview, supra note 16.
236. RERP, supra note 17, at app. 14-2.
237. Id.
238. There are research reactors at the University of Virginia and at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University. RERP, supra note 17, at app. 13.

239. Mr. McNeer said that there are frequent shipments, but no figures were available as
to frequency. Telephone interview, supra note 16.
240. These shipments are pursuant to an agreement signed by President Carter whereby
the United States receives spent fuel from Europe, in an attempt to diminish the possibility
of sabotage of plutonium in Europe. There is approximately one shipment per month. The
Coast Guard accompanies the ship while in U.S. waters. It is guarded in the port by commercial armed guards, and is accompanied by armed guard, pursuant to NRC regulations,
upon leaving the port by truck. Telephone interview with Mr. Stroud, Executive Director,
Virginia Port Authority, Portsmouth, Va. (Oct. 4, 1983).
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The possibility of shipments of spent fuel from VEPCO's Surry nuclear
generating plant in Surry County, Virginia, to its North Anna plant in
Louisa County, Virginia, would substantially increase the volume of Type
B large quantity shipments on Virginia's roads.

41

The routes which have

been approved by the NRC consist of combinations of state, interstate,
and county highways, and each would pass through densely populated areas, such as Richmond, Petersburg, and Hopewell. 42 Opposition to this
proposal has been vehement and organized.243 If Virginia were to become
a site for a permanent repository,2 44 opposition to shipments of spent fuel
might become even more vocal and vehement.
D. The Spotsylvania County Ordinance:An Analysis in Light of Federal and State Regulatory Activity
In response to the proposed shipments of spent fuel from Surry to
North Anna, the Board of Supervisors of Spotsylvania County in March,
1983 unanimously passed an ordinance2 45 purporting to regulate ship241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra note 8.
Richmond Times Dispatch, July 30, 1982, § B, at 1, col. 6.
See supra note 8.
See supra note 9.
Pertinent portions are reproduced: NUCLEAR MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION

ORDINANCE

FOR SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY.

Section 1.

Findings;Purpose

(a) The purposes of this ordinance are:
(1) To protect, secure and promote the public health, safety, and general welfare of
the inhabitants of the County of Spotsylvania, consistent with the general laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia; (2) To provide minimum standards and regulations insuring the safe shipment and transportation of radioactive materials through the County
of Spotsylvania; (3) To require a showing by the proposed shipper of certain types of
radioactive materials, of (i) the reasons for each proposed shipment or series of shipments, and (ii) the public or private highway, roads, streets or alleys over which said
materials will be shipped.
(b) The board of Supervisors of the County of Spotsylvania finds that:
(1) The number of radioactive material shipments is increasing and will continue to
increase, according to studies commissioned by the United States Government; and
(2) The transportation of radioactive materials poses a potentially substantial threat
to the health, safety, and general welfare of the inhabitants of Spotsylvania County;
and (3) In the event of a transportation accident, terrorist action, or subversive act
involving radioactive materials, the protection of public health, safety and general
welfare will fall first and principally on the County. The County must therefore prepare emergency response procedures and train the public safety officials in the proper
response to such an incident; and (4) Local emergency response personnel have indicated that their training and equipment are currently inadequate to deal with the
consequences of a release of radiation resulting from a transportation accident, terrorist action or subversive act; and (5) The cost of emergency procedures and training
should properly be borne by those who introduce the risk, i.e., the producers and/or
shippers of radioactive material.
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ments of radioactive materials through the county.24 Although the ordinance appears to govern a broad range of shipments, it is aimed primarily
at, and was motivated by, the Surry to North Anna shipments. 247 No re-

quests for certificates of transport have yet been made by any carriers
currently transporting through Spotsylvania County on Interstate 95, nor
have any penalties been imposed for noncompliance.248
Spotsylvania does not lie on the primary route which would be used;
out of a projected thirty Surry to North Anna shipments per year, none
of these would pass through Spotsylvania unless the Primary Route and
Alternate Routes C and D were inoperative due to temporary road or
weather conditions.2 49 Based on these facts, it may appear that Spotsylvania has "jumped the gun" by its declared intention to intervene in events
which have little likelihood of occurring. On the other hand, this ordinance may be considered a good faith attempt to intervene in an event
which menacingly hovers in the future.
Although VEPCO has declared that it is interested in complying with
this ordinance,25 0 if a certificate of transfer were to be denied, or an in-

(b) A certificate of Emergency Transport for a shipment, or series of shipments shall be
issued by the Coordinator or his designee with approval by the Board of Supervisors
(except as provided in Section 2(b) herein), after finding by the Board, upon the filing
of a statement by the producer and/or shipper, that:
(1) The proposed shipment or shipments will not pose a substantial risk to the health,
safety and general welfare of the inhabitants of the County of Spotsylvania; (2) The
routes of transportation do not pass within two-hundred and fifty (250) feet of public
institutions such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, day care centers, courthouses or
other public institutions at which more than fifty (50) people are typically gathered.
Section 4. Fees for the Issuance of the Certificate of Emergency Transport and
Period of Validity:
(a) Upon the final approval by the Board of Supervisors as contemplated in Subsection
3(b) above and upon the issuance of Certificate of Emergency Transport the shipper
shall pay a fee in the amount of $200.00 for each shipment authorized by such Certificate. Upon expiration of the Certificate of Emergency Transport the Coordinator shall
refund to the shipper the amount of $200.00, for each shipment authorized by such
Certificate but not made, except that the Coordinator shall be entitled to retain
$100.00 in connection with each Certificate of Emergency Transport issued by him
without regard to whether any shipment is actually made pursuant to such Certificate.
Spotsylvania County, Va., Ordinance to Regulate Transportation of Nuclear Materials
(March 23, 1983).
246. Telephone interview with Mr. Bob Scott, Coordinator of Emergency Services for
Spotsylvania County, Va. (Sept. 29, 1983).
247. Telephone interview with Mr. Ron Maupin, Attorney for Spotsylvania County, Va.
(Oct. 4, 1983).
248. Id.
249. Telephone interview with Mr. Rodney Smith, News Director for VEPCO (Oct. 7,
1983).
250. Richmond Times Dispatch, March 24, 1983, § D, at 1, col. 1.
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junction against shipments were to be requested by the county in the future, VEPCO would be in the position of challenging the ordinance.
Therefore, it is useful to analyze the validity of the Spotsylvania ordinance. Such analysis may also provide guidance for localities in the future, if they are confronted by regular shipments of high-level nuclear
wastes.
1.

Supremacy Clause Analysis

When a state or local exercise of police power is challenged under the
supremacy clause,25 there is an "assumption that the historic police powers of the State are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 5' By requiring that carriers of large quantity Type B packages give notification to the "appropriate governor or governor's designee"' 5' of each state on the carrier's route,
the federal government, through the NRC, acknowledges the valid state
police power of monitoring transportation of radioactive material. States'
procedures of issuing certificates of transport have operated unchallenged
for years. A supremacy clause attack on that procedure would, therefore,
be unsuccessful. The Spotsylvania ordinance should be evaluated, however, in terms of its relationship to the legitimate state monitoring procedure. This evaluation can be facilitated through a commerce clause
analysis.
2.

Commerce Clause Analysis

The commerce clause 25 grants power to the federal government to keep
the flow of interstate commerce unhindered by state action. An ordinance
purporting to regulate the transportation of radioactive materials, which
will include substantial amounts of nuclear waste, will be subject to a
commerce clause test for two reasons. First, waste products are considered to be within the flow of commerce, even though the waste may not
be a marketable commodity. 55 Second, nuclear waste incident to generation of power is part of the total nuclear cycle.156 Nuclear wastes comprise
a "current of commerce '257 component of the production of energy. Nuclear energy may be perceived as a six-step process: mining uranium, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, generation, and storage. 58 An impedi251. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
252. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 239 (1947).
253. 10 C.F.R. § 71.5a (1980).
254. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,cl. 3.
255. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
256. Brief for Plaintiff at 39, Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Louisa County, Va., No. 831241 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 1983).
257. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922).
258. See Brief for Plaintiff at 39, Louisa County, No. 83-1241 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 1983).
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ment to any one of these steps may affect any of the others.
The current analysis of burden on commerce questions is a case-by-case
approach that balances the need for uniform and unimpeded commerce
against the legitimate need of states and localities to supervise local
safety concerns. 259 The first inquiry must be whether the ordinance is
facially discriminatory, that is, does it favor local interests to the exclusion of others? 26 0 The Spotsylvania ordinance makes no distinction between radioactive materials originating within the county or state and
those originating outside of it; clearly there is no per se discrimination.
If no discrimination is found, the inquiry turns to the legitimacy of the
local purpose, and whether that local purpose can be "promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities." '61 As applied to the Spotsylvania County situation, the remainder of the commerce clause test involves an assessment of the county's concern as well as the effectiveness
of the regulations designed to confront that concern. Certainly a local
concern does exist in the promotion of safety, and in the ability of county
personnel to respond in the event of an accident. However, is there dan!
ger such that "[a]ny vibration on the highway, or even an accident, could
create a problem"? 26 2 Does a decision by the County Board of Supervisors
truly enhance the safety of transportation?
Consideration of risks of nuclear waste transportation requires examination of both accident-free, normal transportation, and of the consequences of accidents. 6 3 Accident-free, normal transportation involves
"normal population dose," small amounts of radiation emitting from everything from small Type A packages to spent fuel casks.2 64 Estimated total population dose from radioactive materials transportation in 1985 will
be 25,400 person rems,265 compared with 40,000,000 person rems received
by the United States population from natural background radiation.266 It
is estimated that transportation contributes .1% of total dose of back259. Trosten & Ancarrow, supra note 184, at 286.
260. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (modern burden-on-commerce

test).
261. Id. at 142.
262. New York Times, Oct. 6, 1983, at A18,col. 1 (excerpt of a quotation from Mayor Ed
Gregorski of Dunkirk, N. Y., expressing the uninformed fear of his community pursuant to
shipment of fuel from West Valley, N.Y. to Two Rivers, Wis.).
263. Highway Routing of Radioactive Material, Dep't of Transportation, 45 Fed. Reg.
7140 (1980) (later codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 173, 177) [hereinafter cited as Highway Routing].
Information quoted hereafter was collected pursuant to a study conducted prior to the establishment of routing rules.
264. 45 Fed. Reg. 7144 (1980).
265. Rem is the acronym for Roentgen Equivalent Man, the unit of dose of any ionizing
radiation which produces the same biological effect as a unit of absorbed dose of ordinary xray. RERP, supra note 17, at app. 15-7.
266. Highway Routing, supra note 263, at 7144.
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ground radiation, 267 and that total background radiation causes "an aver-

age of 3.07 latent cancer fatalities per year." '6s Based on these estimates,
accident-free, normal transportation poses a minimal danger to
Spotsylvania.
The consequences of an accident are largely speculative. However, current professional consensus in terms of types of events and possibility of
occurrence does exist:
1. a nuclear waste or spent fuel accident cannot give rise to a nuclear
explosion,
2. only a radiological transportation accident involving sabotage of plutonium or spent fuel shipments can give rise to an accident which threatens fatalities, and
3. apart from the possibility of sabotage causing a nuclear waste shipment accident, estimates as to release fraction 6 9 vary greatly; it is wise to
allow for the possibility that ten or more radiological fatalities could be
associated
with extreme accidents involving high level wastes and spent
0
27

fuel.

Although these possibilities sound ominous, the likelihood of occurrence of a worst case accident is extremely remote. For example, a hypothetical worst case accident involving a shipment of spent fuel through a
high density urban area is likely to occur once in a billion years. 271 While

such possibilities seem infinitesimally remote, concern is legitimate in an
area characterized by many variables and by a paucity of historical
data.272 It is doubtful, however, that the issuance of a certificate by the
County Board of Supervisors will further the legitimate local purpose of
protecting the safety of its citizens. The Board members have undoubtedly acted with the best of intentions, but they are elected officials without professional-level expertise in radiological hazards.2 7 3 Moreover, the

$200 fee will probably not serve as a viable revenue generating measure in
furtherance of the legitimate economic purpose, since the anticipated
Surry to North Anna shipments passing through Spotsylvania will be
267. See City of New York v. Department of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 745 (2d Cir. 1983).
"Latent cancer fatality" is a death that results from exposure to radiation, that occurs more
than a year after exposure, and that would not have occurred in the absence of the exposure. Id. at 745 n.13.
268. Id. at 745.
269. "Release fraction" refers to the fraction of radioactive material released into the air.
Norton, supra note 2, at 741.
270. Id. at 740-41.
271. Highway Routing, supra note 263, at 7143.
272. Norton, supra note 2, at 739. Accidents involving releases of radioactivity have all
occurred with Type A packages. Therefore, there is no data as to the consequences of accidents involving Type B or Type B large quantity packaging.
273. Telephone interview, supra note 246.
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minimal. 274
These local purposes can "be promoted with a lesser impact on interstate activities. ' 275 A primary purpose of the ordinance is that of giving
notification, a function already assigned to the state OES. 276 In 1979, the
Board of Supervisors of Anne Arundel County, Maryland, enacted an ordinance regulating the passage of hazardous wastes through the county by
means of certificate issuance, prenotification requirement, and licensing
fee. 7 The Spotsylvania ordinance virtually mirrors these requirements.
In examining the Anne Arundel ordinance, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted:
Thus, the local ordinances would not appear to be necessary for Anne Arundel County to accomplish its second series of objectives, namely to have
knowledge of the nature of hazardous substances being transported through
the county. Between the State and federal laws and regulations, all transportation of hazardous substances through the county is already subject to
the type of controls and requirements which the county seeks to impose
through the portions dealing with transportation. Thus the county's interest
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. 78
The court recognized that the prenotification could be accomplished
through less burdensome means because it is provided for by the state.
Furthermore, county imposed requirements would pose an undue burden
on commerce because hazardous waste movement in interstate commerce
is "not a subject admitting to 'diversity of treatment' ,,;279 due to the potential cumulative effect of county-to-county imposition of license fees,
the court found that the licensing fee would impose an undue burden on
28
commerce. 0
This reasoning is applicable to evaluation of the Spotsylvania ordinance. According to the modern burden-on-commerce test,281 the ordinance would fail.
3.

Could Spotsylvania County Successfully Seek a Nonpxeemption Rul-

ing Under Section 112 of the Hazardous Material Transportation Act?
Section 112 of the HMTA28 2 provides that any requirement of a state
274.
275.
276.
277.
(1981).

See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
Telephone interview, supra note 247.
Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136,

278. Id. at

279.
280.
281.
282.
U.S.C.

-

-

, 438 A.2d 269, 270

, 438 A.2d at 276.

Id.
Id.
See generally Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137.
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156, 49
§ 1811 (1975).
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or political subdivision which is not consistent"' with any requirement of
the HMTA or regulation issued under the HMTA is not preempted if it
can be shown that such requirement 1) affords an equal or greater level of
protection to the public than is afforded by the requirements of the title
or of regulations issued under the title and 2) does not unreasonably bur2 4
den commerce.
The Spotsylvania ordinance
for a nonpreemption ruling.8 5
HMTA,2 81 and the cumulative
quirements of the ordinance,
nonpreemption ruling.
4.

has been forwarded to DOT with a request
In light of the congressional intent behind
burdensome effect on commerce of the reit is reasonable to anticipate denial of a

Could Spotsylvania County Reasonably Expect Injunctive Relief?

The ordinance provides that "violation of any provision of this Chapter
may be enjoined by appropriate civil proceedings. ' 28 7 Criminal and civil
penalties for noncompliance with State Board of Health transportation
requirements have been provided for by statute. 28 Furthermore, there is
precedent for denial of an injunction against shipments of spent fuel
28 9
through a Virginia municipality.
A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show first, a likelihood of success on the merits, then, that it will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is not granted, and last, that other parties to the action would not be
substantially harmed.28 0 The plaintiff in Virginia Sunshine Alliance,
seeking an injunction against shipments of spent fuel through Portsmouth, Virginia, based its showing of irreparable harm on speculation as
to the consequences of a transportation accident. 291 The showing failed;
the court found that this speculation had already been considered by the
283. The basis for inconsistency between the Spotsylvania ordinance and rules promulgated under HMTA-DOT could be found in substantive differences between the two. For
example, advance notification required by federal regulations requires "postmark at least
seven days before the beginning of the seven day period during which departure of the
shipment is estimated to occur". 10 C.F.R. § 71.5b(a). The Spotsylvania ordinance requires
notification 90 days prior to shipment. § 22-3(a); see also 49 C.F.R. § 177, app. A (1981).
284. 49 U.S.C. § 1811 (1975).
285. Telephone interview, supra note 247.
286. For a discussion concerning congressional intent to avoid multiplicity of state and
local regulations, see National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819 (1st Cir.
1979).
287. Spotsylvania County, Va., Ordinance to Regulate Transportation of Nuclear Materials § 22-6(b) (March 23, 1983).
288. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-278.3 (Repi. Vol. 1982).
289. Virginia Sunshine Alliance v. Hendrie, 477 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1979).
290. Id.
291. Id.
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NRC in its approval of shipping routes. 292
Furthermore, it has been ruled that DOT routing regulations are "rationally related to the statute's policy of developing acceptable levels of
public safety for each mode of transportation" and therefore provide adequate safeguards. 293 In addition, psychological impact of fear on a community is not a "cognizable environmental impact. '294 Therefore, psychological harm would not figure into a showing of irreparable harm.
In seeking an injunction against violations of the county ordinance,
Spotslyvania's showing of irreparable harm would have to consist of speculation as to the consequences of an accident, and would not include a
showing of adverse psychological impact on the community. Accordingly,
Spotsylvania County would probably not be awarded injunctive relief.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Northern States and Pacific Gas & Electric indicates that unless there is clear and manifest congressional intent to the
contrary, state regulation of nuclear power plants will not be preempted.
Section 274's vague statutory construction and legislative history reveal a
less than clear intent from Congress to preempt state and local regulation
of nuclear waste disposal. Although subsection 274(k) authorizes state
and local governments to regulate for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards, a majority of courts neglect to make the essential purpose inquiry. Even though a recent Supreme Court decision permits states, in limited circumstances, to impose moratoriums on the construction of nuclear power plants, the Court specifically rejected the idea
of state regulation of the construction and operation of already existing
power plants.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides timely legislation as to preemption over permanent waste disposal, but its preemptive effect over interim
storage is far less clear. Because of esoteric preemption principles and
vague congressional precepts, state and local governments such as Louisa
County are provided little if any guidance as to what they may regulate in
the area of nuclear wastes. Although the scope of state regulation has
been narrowed by recent legislation, Congress must provide a more defined role for state and local governments in the disposal of nuclear
wastes.
The roles of state and local governments with respect to transportation
of nuclear wastes have become more defined, so that there should be little
question as to where responsibilities lie. Therefore, citizens' groups and
292. Id.
293. City of New York v. Department of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1983).
294. Id. at 751.
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local governments which attempt to establish separate standards for
transportation procedures are engaging in an ineffective endeavor. The
effective course of dealing with the fears and insecurities associated with
transportation of nuclear waste must be on the state level. Expansion of
training programs for local personnel and augmentation of local equipment must be accelerated. Prompt and efficient use of the Emergency
Preparedness Fund can facilitate improvement of local accident
preparedness to the point that transportation of nuclear wastes will not
be a source of fear and apprehension among citizens.
Marvin Swift
Mars M. Wicker

ADDENDUM
On December 2, 1984, the Department of Transportation announced
that state and local regulations that attempt to restrict transport of spent
nuclear fuel, are inconsistent with federal law and are preempted by the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974.' The Department examined restrictions, imposed by seven state and local governments, which
link a transportation permit to a notification requirement. 2 "The uncoordinated, unilateral imposition of local bans and other severe restrictions
on radioactive materials transportation has the effect of rerouting shipments in a chaotic, unpredictable manner that is damaging to overall
''3
public safety.

1. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
2. Among the restrictions examined were those imposed by the New York State Thruway
Authority. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
3. Richmond Times Dispatch, Dec. 3, 1984, at 1, col. 3.

